Instead of attempting to discredit Israeli companies at the Paris Air Show, it would be far more constructive for French and European military experts to study Israel’s example in building an effective, modern fighting force — one that integrates layered air defense systems, advanced radar technologies, uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), and fifth-generation fighter-bomber aircraft. The unveiling of MBDA’s One-Way Effector (OWE) at the 2025 Paris Air Show — a long-range, jet-powered loitering munition — underscores the persistent gaps in battlefield understanding among some of Europe’s leading defense contractors.
The Enduring Role of the Manned Fighter: Flexibility, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Network-Centric Paradigm
The intense focus on the revolutionary impact of low-cost, attritable drones risks obscuring a more fundamental truth of modern air power: the era of the manned fighter jet is far from over. In fact, the most advanced combat aircraft represent the pinnacle of the integrated Intelligence-C2-Effector cycle, offering a level of flexibility and network-centric capability that standalone drones cannot replicate. To truly understand “effectivity for the buck,” one must look beyond simple unit cost and analyze the total operational value a platform brings to the entire force. The Israeli Air Force provides a compelling case study in this regard, demonstrating a mature vision of integrated air power that stands in stark contrast to Europe’s chiefly effect-focused procurement.
Operational Flexibility is the Name of the Game
Modern multi-role fighter jets, by contrast, offer unparalleled operational flexibility. A single aircraft like an F-35 or Rafale can seamlessly switch between air superiority, deep-strike, reconnaissance, and ground support missions, often within the same sortie—a level of adaptability that current drone fleets cannot match.
This flexibility is amplified by the presence of a human pilot, who remains the most complex and capable problem-solving machine on the battlefield. In a dynamic and contested environment, a pilot can adapt to unforeseen circumstances, exercise battlefield judgment, and continue the mission even when communication links are jammed or severed—a critical vulnerability for remotely operated drones. The superior speed, maneuverability, and survivability of manned fighters continue to be decisive advantages in high-intensity combat.
It is true and undeniable that UAS are an essential tool on today’s battlefield and are here to stay; however, for the foreseeable future, they will complement manned fighters, rather than the other way around.
Redefining Cost-Effectiveness: The Value of the Networked Warfighter
On a per-unit basis, drones are undeniably cheaper than modern fighter jets. An F-35 costs over $80 million, whereas an MQ-9 Reaper costs around $32 million and a simple FPV drone can be just a few hundred dollars. However, this simple comparison is misleading. True cost-effectiveness is measured by the ability to achieve strategic objectives.
The value of a platform like the F-35 lies not in its cost, but in its role as a reusable, upgradable, and powerful “force multiplier”. It is designed from the ground up as the most advanced node in a network-centric architecture. By gathering, processing, and sharing vast amounts of data, it enhances the situational awareness, lethality, and survivability of every other asset on the battlefield—from other aircraft to ground and naval forces. This ability to elevate the entire force is a return on investment that single-use, attritable drones cannot provide.
Case Study: The Israeli F-35I and the Network-Centric Paradigm
No nation better exemplifies the power of a truly integrated, network-centric fighting force than Israel. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has long pioneered the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) and the deep integration of manned and unmanned systems. Their approach to the F-35 provides a masterclass in doctrinal clarity.
Israel did not simply purchase the F-35; it transformed it into the F-35I “Adir” by integrating its own indigenous electronic warfare suites, command and control systems, and weaponry. This turned the aircraft into a central sensor and C2 node explicitly tailored for Israel’s multi-layered defense architecture. In practice, the F-35I is used as the “quarterback of the skies”. F-35Is conduct the initial penetration of contested airspace, using their stealth and advanced sensors to neutralize air defenses and build a real-time intelligence picture. This data is then networked to other assets, such as F-15I fighters, which can follow with heavy payloads for sustained strikes.
This is the Intelligence-C2-Effector cycle operating at its most sophisticated level. The most valuable platform is not just an effector, but the primary enabler of the entire network. This “cycle-first” philosophy, which leverages the unique strengths of both manned and unmanned systems in a coordinated whole, is the antithesis of the “Effector Fallacy.” It demonstrates that achieving a decisive edge in modern warfare requires not just a focus on mass-produced drones, but a deep investment in the high-end, flexible, and networked platforms that can lead the fight.
The One way effector
The One-Way Effector (OWE), unveiled by MBDA at the 2025 Paris Air Show, is a new long-range, jet-powered kamikaze drone, also described as a “saturation munition.” Its development was allegedly heavily influenced by the tactical lessons from the war in Ukraine, specifically the effectiveness of massed drone attacks.
The primary mission of the OWE is not to act as a standalone high-precision weapon, but to conduct saturation missions against enemy air defenses. The operational concept is to launch the drones in large salvos or “swarms” to overwhelm, exhaust, and force the reveal of sophisticated enemy air defense systems. By doing so, they clear a path for more expensive, high-value munitions, such as SCALP or Storm Shadow cruise missiles, to reach their targets. The OWE is designed to force an adversary to expend valuable and costly interceptors on a low-cost, attritable target. So why not launch them from the air and be much more effective? Defense Week could not get a straight answer.
Core Specifications
The technical details provided across the articles outline a platform designed for range and speed at a low cost.
- Type: One-Way Effector / Loitering Munition / Kamikaze Drone
- Propulsion: Turbojet Engine (Düsenstrahltriebwerk)
- Range: Up to 500 kilometers (approximately 310 miles)
- Speed: 400 kilometers per hour
- Payload/Warhead: 40 kg
- Dimensions: Wingspan of approximately 3 meters
- Launch Method: Ground-launched from a ramp or hangar
Design and Production Philosophy
The design philosophy of the OWE is a significant departure from traditional high-end missile systems and is central to its strategic purpose.
- Low Cost for Mass Production: The entire system was designed from the ground up with the goal of low-cost, high-volume manufacturing.
- Use of COTS Components: To keep costs down, many components are sourced “off-the-shelf.”
- Non-Stealth Design: The drone is intentionally not designed to be stealthy. Its purpose is to be detected and engaged by air defenses, thereby depleting them.
- Automotive Industry Partnership: In an innovative industrial strategy, MBDA is partnering with a major, unnamed French automotive company (explicitly stated not to be Renault) to leverage its mass-production capabilities, supply chain, and assembly procedures.
Development and Production Timeline
The program is on an exceptionally rapid development schedule, reflecting its operational urgency.
- Program Start: Design work began from scratch in December 2024.
- First Test Flight: Planned for September or October 2025.
- First Production: The first production batch is anticipated in 2027.
- Production Rate: The target production output, enabled by the automotive partnership, is up to 1,000 units per month.
Conclusion
Europe’s defense industry, in its rush to respond to the war in Ukraine, is learning a superficial lesson. It is correctly identifying the need for new types of weapons—low-cost, attritable drones—and the need for industrial capacity to produce them at scale. However, it is fundamentally failing to grasp the most critical lesson of modern, high-intensity warfare: that the effectiveness of any single effector is determined almost entirely by its integration into a resilient, intelligent, and adaptive Intelligence-C2-Effector cycle.
The Effector Fallacy Revisited
The development of systems like the MBDA One-Way Effector is the primary symptom of this “Effector Fallacy.” The program’s focus is on the industrial challenge of mass-producing a technologically competent but doctrinally simple platform. Its standalone, fire-and-forget operational concept is a relic of a previous era of warfare, ill-suited to a dynamic battlespace characterized by ubiquitous surveillance, pervasive electronic warfare, and fleeting targets.
By focusing on producing impressive hardware without the networked intelligence and command architecture to wield it effectively, Europe risks investing billions of euros in an arsenal that is doctrinally obsolete upon arrival. This path leads toward a “hollow force”—one that looks formidable in brochures and at airshows but lacks the integrated nervous system required to fight and win a 21st-century war. The true revolution in Ukraine is not about drones; it is about software, networks, and the agile, bottom-up integration of the entire kill chain.
Until Europe’s defense establishment internalizes this lesson, it will continue to build the wrong capabilities for the right reasons. Some things have not changed in the last hundred years, and one of them is: He who controls the sky controls the war.
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